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Abstract: Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has worked
to prevent another terrorist attack on American citizens. One possible form of attack could be
intentional adulteration of the food supply. This paper examines that threat and poses the question:
Should the United States reduce its commitment to free trade in food in order to protect the
American public from a foodborne attack? Part I examines the likelihood of an attack on the food
supply and the actions the federal government has taken thus far to prevent such an attack. Part
II explores the U.S. commitment to free trade in food in the past few decades by investigating its
involvement in international institutions designed to promote free trade, including GATT, the WTO,
and NAFTA. Part III analyzes economic arguments for and against trade in all goods, including
food. Part IV discusses the eﬀects of trade liberalization on food safety. Part V evaluates arguments
and counterarguments on the relationship between trade liberalization and food security. Finally,
Part VI contains the ﬁnal conclusion that the United States should continue its commitment to free
trade in all goods, regardless of the possibility of an attack on the food supply. Such an attack
could be prevented through other measures, especially by increasing the amount of FDA and USDA
import inspectors.
I. Terrorism and the Food Supply
A.
How Could Terrorists Aﬀect the Food Supply?
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 changed American society forever. The long-term eﬀects will surely
1be felt for years to come, but short-term results are already apparent. One such result is that the average
American no longer feels completely safe in the world. While most people who were not directly aﬀected
have attempted to move on with their lives, many have lingering fears that the next terror attack could strike
at any time and directly involve them. Despite these fears, the average American is unequipped to protect
himself adequately against unexpected attacks. Instead it is the responsibility of the federal government to
anticipate future terror incidents and protect the public against them.
To this end, federal policymakers have worked tirelessly since September 11 to identify aspects of American life
that are vulnerable to terror activities. One commonly mentioned area of vulnerability is the food supply.1 Policy-
makers fear that terrorists could utilize bacteria or other harmful agents to adulterate food at numerous points on
the supply chain. Possibilities range from exposing livestock to foot-and-mouth disease to tainting salad bars with
salmonella.2 In addition to numerous points of introduction, there are numerous harmful agents that could be
used. Commonly mentioned possibilities include anthrax, smallpox, the plague, botulism, dysentery, cyclospora,
hepatitis, tularemia, and hemorrhagic fever.3 Since the possible points of introduction and harmful agents are so
numerous, it is diﬃcult for the government to formulate a broad-based plan of action to prevent terror attacks
on the food supply.
Despite this diﬃculty, many policymakers believe the threat to the food supply is very real. At a speech on food
safety and security at the fourth annual Food Safety Summit and Expo, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, the only
senator to serve simultaneously on the Armed Services, Intelligence and Agriculture Committees, elaborated on his
1See, e.g., Robert Vosburgh, Fresh Threat; The Food Industry Seeks To Build Better Safeguards Against
Bioterrorism, Supermarket News, Nov. 5, 2001, at 27.
2Id.
3Frederick Golden, What’s Next?; It Could Be Smallpox, Botulism or Other Equally Deadly Biological
Agents, Time, Nov. 5, 2001, at 44.
2fears.4 He revealed that several of the terrorists involved with the events of September 11 had advanced degrees
in Agriculture.5 He also reported that Al Qaeda documents captured by U.S. troops in Afghanistan indicate an
intention to use crop-dusting planes to spread germs over vast regions of the U.S.6 Finally, he detailed visits
he had made to weapons factories in the former Soviet Union; these factories contained stockpiles of livestock
diseases and other germs that had been retained for use against the United States in case of war.7 These factories
are poorly guarded, and Roberts speculated that many of the germs had already been sold to foreign governments
or groups.8
In all this negative information, one positive point is that many policymakers believe that fatalities from attacks
on the food supply would be minimal.9 Experts believe that disaster relief programs are organized well enough to
contain outbreaks and avoid vast loss of human life.10 On the other hand, an attack on the food supply could
cause immense economic damage.11 The agricultural sector constitutes $500 billion of U.S. GDP, and $60 billion
of this ﬁgure comes from exports.12 Additionally, the U.S. agricultural sector employs ten million workers.13 If con-
sumers, either domestic or foreign, stop buying American food products, the economic eﬀects could be devastating.
4Milford Prewitt, Safety Summit: Securing U.S. Food Supply an Uphill Battle, Nation’s Restaurant
News, Mar. 25, 2002, at 1.
5Id.
6Id.
7Id.
8See id.
9See Thomas Frank, Fight Over Food Supply Safety; Amid Fears of Terror, Congress, Industry Disagree
on Regulations, Newsday, Apr. 7, 2002, at A8.
10See id.
11Id.
12Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty Revisited: Food Safety Regulations – Cross-Border Implications – A
U.S. Perspective, 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 377, 378 (1998).
13Id.
3B.
What Responses Have Been Proposed?
As a result, the federal government must take action to protect the food supply against inﬁltration by terrorist
groups. Since September 11, several responses have been proposed. In fact, on September 12, 2001, oﬃcials
from the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) collectively appealed to food industry oﬃcials to evaluate the security of the food
supply chain and ﬁx any problems.14
Since then, most of the work on the food security problem has been done by the food industry itself. While the
complete details have not been released to the public for security reasons, the industry has taken action.15 First,
trade groups like the United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association and the International Dairy Foods Association
have formed their own task forces on food safety.16 These task forces have developed food safety checklists
for members of the trade groups. The checklists address such issues as hiring security for processing and stor-
age areas, reevaluating transportation networks, screening potential employees, and revising import procedures.17
Second, another trade group, the National Grocers Association (NGA), has urged its members to begin employee
education programs.18 These programs have two goals: 1) teaching employees to spot potential hazards and 2)
teaching employees to relate safety information to the public.19
However, any complete food security plan must involve the federal government. Proposals have suggested that
14Vosburgh supra note 1.
15See Diane Feen, Bioterrorism Threat Has Food PR Pros On Edge, O’Dwyer’s PR Services Report,
Mar. 2002, at 1.
16Vosburgh supra note 1.
17Id.
18Seth Mendelson, Keeping Our Food Safe, Grocery Headquarters, Dec. 1, 2001, at 18.
19Id.
4the government respond in several ways. First, some argue that more research should be done on the biology of
foodborne pathogens.20 If the government has a better understanding of the way the pathogens operate, it can
develop a more targeted response plan in the event of a bioterrorist attack. The government could complete this
biological research in its own labs or it could fund private research eﬀorts.
Second, some proposals suggest that the national food regulatory system should be revamped. One problem
with the current system is that the agencies had no speciﬁc bioterrorist attack response plan in place prior to
September 11.21 Another problem is that the responsibility for protecting the food supply falls to at least nine
diﬀerent agencies.22 Critics claim that the fractured nature of the regulatory system could lead to holes in cov-
erage, lack of communication and coordination, and “passing the buck” from agency to agency.23 Congress is
therefore considering legislation to consolidate all food safety regulatory bodies into a centralized agency.24
Third, other proposals suggest that the food regulatory agencies should hire more inspectors. Immediately after
September 11, the FDA employed only 600 inspectors who were responsible for safeguarding over 50,000 domes-
tic food processing facilities.25 An additional 150 inspectors examined food imports.26 This small number of
inspectors was disproportionate to the four million shipments of food that enter the United States from over one
hundred countries each year.27 As a result of this shortage of inspectors, the FDA only inspected 1% of food
imports.28
Finally, another proposal suggests that the federal government require country-of-origin labeling on all imported
food products. However, grocery stores and their trade associations oppose this suggestion because it would
20See id.
21See Vosburgh, supra note 1.
22Id.
23See id.
24See Cecelia Blalock, An Air of Uncertainty: As the Grocery Industry Looks Ahead in 2002, There’s
Always a Caveat, Grocery Headquarters, Feb. 1, 2002, at 10.
25Carol Radice, Government Focuses on Food Safety; Ensuring the Safety of the Nation’s Food Supply
Has Taken Center Stage in Light of Concerns About Bioterrorism, Grocery Headquarters, Feb. 1,
2002, at 10.
26Vosburgh, supra note 1.
27See id.
28Radice, supra note 25.
5increase their costs signiﬁcantly.29 The Bush Administration and much of the Senate disapprove of the idea, so
it is unlikely it will be implemented unless there is a political shift.30
C.
What Has the Government Done?
Several branches of the federal government have responded to the food safety proposals. As part of his $20
billion counter-terrorism bill, President Bush requested and Congress approved $61 million for food safety
initiatives.31 Most of this money will be used to hire new employees, including 600 new food inspectors.32
One-half of these will be employed at ports of entry for food imports, one-fourth will be employed as do-
mestic food inspectors, and the rest will be employed at the FDA labs.33 Thirty-ﬁve of the new domestic
food inspectors have been trained in a special course at Texas A&M University focusing on microbiological
hazards to the food supply.34
President Bush again tackled the food terrorism issue in his 2003 ﬁscal year budget proposals. The adminis-
tration has requested $328.1 million for USDA counter-terrorism measures; this money would help improve
food safety labs, hire more inspectors, and purchase technology to toughen import inspections.35 The ad-
ministration has requested an additional $159 million for FDA counter-terrorism measures; with this money,
the FDA will ensure that it has an inspector at each possible port of entry for imports.36
29See Blalock, supra note 24.
30See id.
31Radice, supra note 25.
32Id.
33Id.
34Id.
35Kristi Ellis, Bush Lieutenants Stress Security Measures, Supermarket News, Mar. 18, 2002, at 1.
36Id.
6The food regulatory agencies have also responded to criticism that they are unable to handle a food terror incident.
For example, the USDA created the Food Emergency Rapid Response and Evaluation Team; this group will be
the central command for USDA employees in the event of a bioterrorist incident.37 The USDA also established
the Foodborne Outbreak Coordination Group; this group will be the coordinating mechanism for federal, state
and local authorities in the event of a bioterrorist incident.38
Additionally, the FDA researched food safety precautions in cooperation with the food industry.39 The result was
publication of voluntary guidelines for restaurants, grocery stores, farms, and food processing plants in the Federal
Register on January 9, 2002.40 The Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) insists that large companies have
already implemented most of the guidelines.41 Small businesses face greater costs of implementation, so they are
instituting the suggestions at a slower pace. In addition to the guidelines for domestic food operations, the FDA
also published guidelines for importers of foreign foods and food products.42 There is no data on the degree of
implementation of these speciﬁcations.
D.
Why Are Imports A Special Problem?
Despite this attempt by the FDA to provide guidance to importers, foreign food products imported into the United
37Vosburgh, supra note 1.
38Id.
39See Kim Severson, Food Fright; FDA Dishes Out New Anti-Terror Rules To Protect Farms,
Restaurants, Groceries, The San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 9, 2002, at A1.
40See Allen Houston, FDA Moves To Educate US Food Suppliers, PR Week (US), Jan. 14, 2002, at 1.
41Severson, supra note 39.
42See Guidance for Industry – Importers and Filers: Food Security Preventive Measures Guidance, 67
Fed. Reg. 1224 (Jan. 9, 2002).
7States pose a signiﬁcant opportunity for terrorists. HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson stated in October of 2001
that safety of imports is the most serious food-related security issue.43 As just one example, a common source
of food additives is gum arabic, a plant imported into the United States largely from Sudan.44 Since Sudan
has been linked to terrorist groups, including Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, Sudanese imports pose some risk of
contamination.45 Yet, Sudanese gum arabic plants enter the United States via Canada, and they are not inspected
at the border because of NAFTA regulations.46
Even imports that enter the United States without the assistance of trade agreements pose a signiﬁcant danger.
As mentioned above, FDA employees inspect only one percent of imported food products. It is doubtful that
resources could ever be increased to a level where even a majority of imports were inspected. As a result, the
American public faces a situation where millions of imported foods enter the country unexamined every year. Any
one of these food products could be deliberately contaminated with a foodborne pathogen. This pathogen could
then spread, causing huge economic loss and possibly even human fatalities.
If the United States cannot adequately inspect imports, should we import as many food products as we currently
do? A possible solution to the problem of bioterrorism through imported foods is to restrict imports, particularly
from countries like Sudan that have terrorist ties. This would be a drastic measure, especially considering the fact
that the United States has been committed to a regime of free trade for the past few decades. Still, the protection
of the American public in a time of war and uncertainty could warrant drastic measures. The remainder of this
paper will answer the question: Should the United States reduce its commitment to free trade in food in order to
protect the American public from a foodborne attack?
43Golden supra note 2.
44Id.
45See id.
46Id.
8II.
History of U.S. and International Attitudes Toward Trade in Food
In order to decide whether the U.S. should change its attitude towards trade in food, it is important to examine
past U.S. policy on the issue and the motivations for it. This examination will begin with U.S. participation in
the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) at the end of World War II, discuss the
U.S. involvement in the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and investigate U.S. involvement
in some disputes over trade in food settled under WTO auspices. It will conclude with a brief mention of U.S.
involvement in regional free trade initiatives, like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
A.
GATT
Immediately after World War II, the United States and other countries recognized the role that economic disasters
had in causing the war.47 These nations worked together to establish international economic institutions that
would prevent pre-war economic conditions from reoccurring. The United Nations (UN), International Monetary
Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and General Agreement for
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) were all borne out of these eﬀorts.48 GATT, which became eﬀective on January 1,
1948, was originally intended to create an international body, called the International Trade Organization (ITO),
47See John H. Jackson, et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases,
Materials and Text, 200 (4th ed. 2002).
48Id.
9to facilitate free trade among nations.49 However, the United States, which had initially acted as a major propo-
nent of the ITO, refused to ratify it, and GATT evolved into a multilateral treaty on free trade.50
Through this treaty, signatory nations agreed to reduce tariﬀs and “non-tariﬀ measures” that protected domestic
goods at the expense of imports.51 So-called “non-tariﬀ measures” included quotas, subsidies for domestic produc-
ers, dumping practices, protectionist customs policies, and trade-restrictive safety regulations.52 Two important
obligations of signatory nations to GATT were the Most Favored Nation Clause and the national treatment policy.
The Most Favored Nation Clause stipulated that GATT members must apply the same trade policies to all other
GATT members.53 The national treatment policy stated that GATT members must not discriminate against
imported goods from other GATT nations in favor of domestic goods.54
While these GATT rules originally applied to agricultural products, the U.S. initiated the departure from this prac-
tice. In 1955, the U.S. requested and obtained a waiver from Article XI of GATT so that it could place quotas on
certain imported agricultural products.55 Most other GATT members followed suit and placed their own quotas
on agricultural products.56 For example, when the European Country (EC) formulated its Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), it included provisions stating that it would charge any tariﬀ it wanted on agricultural products.57
Since almost all GATT members, including the U.S., EC, and most developing countries, were ignoring GATT
rules with respect to agricultural products, their policies were never challenged.58
49Mark King, The Dilemma of Genetically Modiﬁed Products at Home and Abroad, 6 Drake J. Agric. L.
241, 244 (2001).
50Id.
51Jackson, supra note 47, at 209.
52Id.
53Id.
54Id.
55Id. at 398.
56Id.
57Id.
58Id.
10B.
WTO
While the United States had been the original party to deviate from GATT agricultural policies, it started to regret
this action in the 1980s and 1990s. GATT nations as a whole recognized the deviation from initial agricultural
policies and began a work program in the early 1980s “to bring agriculture more fully into the multilateral trading
system by improving the eﬀectiveness of GATT rules, provisions and disciplines.”59 This work program created
the Committee on Trade in Agriculture which made several recommendations about bringing trade in agricultural
products back into the GATT domain, but these were never oﬃcially adopted.60 At the same time, GATT mem-
bers began to realize that the entire system, not just trade in agricultural products, had become outdated and
needed reform. To this end, they began the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in Punta del Este, Uruguay in
September of 1986.61
The Uruguay Round eventually resulted in the formation of the World Trade Organization, an international body
chartered to promote free trade among nations. So, GATT members did ﬁnally ratify the International Trade
Organization; however, the ratiﬁcation occurred ﬁfty years late of an organization with a diﬀerent name. Never-
theless, the road to ratiﬁcation, especially of new agricultural provisions, was not easy.
On July 7, 1987, in the midst of the Uruguay Round, the United States proposed a ten-year phase-out of agri-
cultural subsidies and import barriers that impede trade.62 The U.S. also proposed harmonization of food safety
regulations on an international level.63 These proposals were not well received and they actually slowed the
59Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (33rd Supp.) at 19 (1986).
60Dale E. McNiel, Agricultural Trade Symposium: Furthering the Reforms of Agricultural Policies in the
Millennium Round, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 41, 51-2 (2000).
61Id. at 52.
62Id.
63Id.
11progress of the Uruguay Round.64 Three years later in 1990, the US supported a draft agricultural agreement
that called for initial “tariﬃcation” of non-tariﬀ barriers to imports and eventual removal of these tariﬀs.65 This
proposal was too extreme for the EC, and they proposed a less extreme measure calling for a 30% reduction in
aggregate support for domestic agricultural products.66 However, the sides could not agree and the agricultural
issue blocked the closing conference of the Uruguay Round in Brussels.67
The two sides then undertook one year of further negotiations. This year produced a Draft Final Act that called
for a 36% reduction in tariﬀs and a 20% reduction in aggregate support to domestic agricultural products.68
Japanese and European farmers rioted to protest this proposal.69 In response to this sort of political pressure, the
EC rejected the Draft Final Act and the parties returned to the bargaining table. At these ﬁnal negotiations, the
U.S. and EC amended the original Draft Final Act to provide exemptions for support payments to small farmers.70
The parties ﬁnalized the Agreement on Agriculture in 1992; this agreement became part of a set of documents
on trade issues enforced by the WTO.
Three of these documents relate speciﬁcally to trade in food products. The ﬁrst is the aforementioned Agreement
on Agriculture; it stipulates the type and extent of government policies that may be used to assist domestic
agricultural sectors. Second, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement) guides Members in
enacting technical food regulations, including those involving packaging and labeling requirements. Finally, the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) governs the formulation
of domestic food safety standards.
64Id. at 53.
65Id. at 54.
66Id.
67Id. at 54-5.
68Id. at 55.
69Id.
70Id. at 56.
12C.
SPS Agreement71
Final Act, pt. II, Annex 1A (4) (reprinted at http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/spsagr.htm)
[hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
In order to understand the WTO’s authority over domestic food safety standards, it is important to understand the
functions and structure of the SPS Agreement. The Prologue lists the objectives of the Agreement. It begins by
stating that “no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination between Members where the same conditions
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.” It continues by stating that international guidelines
would be useful in steering the development of domestic food safety standards. Finally, the Prologue concludes
by recognizing the special diﬃculties that developing countries might have in complying with the SPS Agreement
and resolving to grant them special consideration.
Article 1 concerns “General Provisions” and declares that the SPS Agreement shall apply to all food safety stan-
dards that directly or indirectly aﬀect international trade. Article 2 discusses “Basic Rights and Obligations” and
conﬁrms that each Member has a right to enact food safety measures necessary to protect the public health.
However, these measures must be based on suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence, and they cannot be disguised restrictions
on international trade. Article 3 involves “Harmonization” and orders Members to base SPS measures on interna-
71See generally Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
13tional standards where possible. Any domestic SPS measure that follows international standards will be deemed
in compliance with the SPS Agreement. Members can only institute domestic safety standards that are more
stringent than international standards when they are based on a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation. Finally, Members have
an obligation to participate in the international bodies that monitor human, animal and plant health, including
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International Oﬃce of Epizootics, and the International Plant
Protection Convention.
Article 4 discusses “Equivalence” and provides a mechanism whereby exporting nations can establish that their
food safety regulations are equivalent to those of an importing nation. Article 5 concerns “Assessment of Risk and
Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection.” It cautions Members to ensure
that their SPS standards are based on risk assessments that use techniques approved by international bodies. In
assessing risks, Members can and should consider scientiﬁc evidence, ecological and environmental conditions,
economic factors, and the objective of minimizing negative trade eﬀects. In situations where there is insuﬃcient
scientiﬁc evidence to make a risk assessment, Members may adopt provisional SPS measures, but they should
attempt to gather further scientiﬁc evidence before making the provisional measures permanent.
Article 6 is entitled “Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest- or Disease-Free Areas and Areas of Low
Pest or Disease Prevalence.” Under this Article, Members cannot apply their domestic food safety standards to
exporting countries as a whole. They must consider the fact that diﬀerent regions of a country have diﬀerent
levels of diseases and pests. In other words, fruit from one region of a country may be safe while the same fruit
from another region is not; consequently, importing nations cannot ban fruit from the entire country. Additionally,
exporting Members may claim that speciﬁc areas within their countries are pest- and disease-free, but they must
provide evidence to support this claim. Article 7 addresses “Transparency,” and it states that Members must
notify other Members of changes in their domestic SPS measures. Article 8 involves “Control, Inspection and
Approval Procedures;” it instructs Members to follow the guidelines of Annex C in establishing national systems
14of control, inspection and approval.
Article 9 entails provisions on “Technical Assistance.” Under it, Members agree to provide assistance to other
Members, especially developing countries, in understanding and complying with domestic SPS regulations. Such
aide may take the form of advice, credits, donations, grants, training or equipment. Article 10 includes provisions
on “Special and Diﬀerential Treatment.” Members consent to consider the needs of developing countries when
enacting domestic SPS measures. Members also agree to implement SPS measures that will be applicable to
developing exporters on a slower schedule than other members. Article 11 considers “Consultation and Dispute
Settlement,” and it speciﬁes that disputes under the SPS Agreement will be settled under the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding. In a dispute involving technical issues, the dispute settlement panel will seek assistance
from scientiﬁc experts.
Article 12 lists “Administration” details. It establishes a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
to implement the agreement. Among other administrative functions, the Committee will facilitate negotiations
between Members on SPS issues, maintain close contact with Codex, and monitor international harmonization of
food safety standards. Article 13 discusses “Implementation” and states that Members are responsible for ensuring
that regional governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) comply with the provisions of the SPS
Agreement. Article 14 involves “Final Provisions;” it discusses adoption of the SPS Agreement by developing
countries.
Finally, the SPS Agreement includes three annexes. The ﬁrst, Annex A, deﬁnes important terms, including san-
itary or phytosanitary measure, harmonization, risk assessment, and others. Annex B, entitled “Transparency
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations,” details procedures that Members must follow when notifying other
Members of new food safety standards. Annex C elaborates on the “Control, Inspection and Approval Proce-
dures” discussed in Article 8. In summary, it ensures that inspections are conducted without undue delays, in a
conﬁdential manner, and to a degree that is reasonable and necessary.
15D.
Codex Alimentarius Commission
Since the SPS Agreement relies so heavily on international standards set by Codex, it is important to understand
the origin and functions of that body. Codex is a subgroup of the United Nations that was founded in 1962 as
a joint project of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).72
It has two functions: (1) to facilitate international trade in food and (2) to promote public health.73 Originally,
Codex set standards to assist in identifying and labeling foods.74 It never claimed to determine food safety
standards. Codex currently has 162 members, and their adherence to Codex standards is voluntary under the
Codex charter.75 Codex members are not obligated to implement Codex standards because Codex is committed
to encouraging the sovereignty of its members.76
Codex evolved into the body that sets international food safety standards after the passage of the SPS Agree-
ment. Before approving standards, including safety standards, Codex delegates them to one of twenty-two
committees for study and review.77 Fourteen of these committees deal with particular types of food and
the remaining eight committees deal with broader issues.78 As the committees perform their work, member
countries and NGOs are allowed to provide comments.79 When the committees ﬁnish their work, they make
72Lucinda Sikes, FDA’s Consideration of Codex Alimentarius Standards in Light of International Trade
Agreements, 53 Food Drug L.J. 327, 328 (1998).
73Id.
74Id.
75Id.
76See John S. Eldred & Shirley A. Coﬃeld, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs To Know: Realizing
the Impact of Globalization on National Food Regulation, 52 Food Drug L.J. 31, 33 (1997).
77See id. at 32.
78Id.
79Id.
16recommendations to the Codex members who decide whether to enact new standards by majority vote.80
The United States is a member of Codex, and it has a governmental agency, called U.S. Codex, which is
responsible for managing U.S. involvement in Codex activities.81 The membership of U.S. Codex consists
of oﬃcials from USDA, FDA, and EPA.82 In 1995, U.S. Codex formulated the U.S. Codex Strategic Plan
which outlines the goals of the United States in its operations with Codex.83 The Plan states ﬁve goals:
(1) the U.S. should support the use of scientiﬁc evidence in developing international food safety standards,
(2) the U.S. should encourage Codex to improve its credibility with world governments, (3) the U.S. should
strive to adopt Codex standards as domestic standards, (4) the U.S. should encourage NGOs to participate
in Codex decisions, and (5) the U.S. should allocate more resources to U.S. Codex.84 The Plan reﬂects the
intention of the U.S. to work towards expansion of international trade and international cooperation in the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
E.
Dispute One: Hormones Case
To further understand the U.S. role in international trade in food in the last few decades, it is important to
understand the U.S. role in several disputes under the SPS Agreement that were resolved through the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The ﬁrst of these was the Hormones Case. Cultural research indicates that Amer-
80Sikes, supra note 72 at 328.
81Eldred & Coﬃeld, supra note 76 at 32.
82Id.
83Oﬃce of the U.S. Coordinator for Codex Alimentarius & Food Safety and Inspection Serv., U.S. Codex
Strategic Plan (1995).
84Id.
17icans and Europeans have diﬀerent attitudes toward the types of food that should be regulated by food safety
standards.85 While Americans are distrustful of unprocessed food products like raw meat and cheese, they are
accepting of technological advances in food preparation like irradiation.86 Europeans have the opposite prefer-
ences; they are accepting of traditional unprocessed food but distrustful of technological alterations to food.87
Thus, it is not surprising that the European Community banned the sale of meat and meat products containing
any residue of bovine growth hormones (BGH) in the late 1980s.88
Immediately, U.S. exports of beef and veal to Europe dropped to almost zero.89 In response, the U.S. government
enacted tariﬀs of almost 100% on certain European agricultural products.90 However, the U.S. had no other
weapon with which to ﬁght the BGH ban until the adoption of the SPS agreement. Then, the U.S. ﬁled a
complaint against the EC, claiming that the EC had violated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because it had
never performed a risk assessment on BGH.91 The EC responded that it had done risk assessments on BGH, and
those studies revealed a vast amount of uncertainty on the long-term eﬀects of the hormones on human health.92
The panel that initially heard the dispute ruled that the EC was not in compliance with Article 5.1.93 Pure
uncertainty is not a strong enough ground to ban any product.94 Instead, the EC should have identiﬁed actual
risks associated with the use of BGH and linked those risks to possible adverse health eﬀects on humans.95 The
85Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: Diﬀerent
Cultures, Diﬀerent Laws, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 525, 528-9 (1998).
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88See First Submission of the United States to the Panel on EC - Measures Concerning Meat and
Products (Hormones), 1996 WL 807619 (Aug. 28, 1996) [hereinafter First Submission of the United
States].
89Lisa K. Seilheimer, Note, The SPS Agreement Applied: The WTO Hormone Beef Case, 4 Envtl. Law
537, 543 (1998).
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91First Submission of the United States, supra note 88.
92First Written Submission of the European Community to the Panel on EC - Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), 1996 WL 807621 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter First Written
Submission of the European Commission].
93WTO Report of the Panel, EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) (reprinted at http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm) [hereinafter
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18EC appealed this result to the Appellate Body who aﬃrmed the essence of the panel decision.96 While this
verdict was an ostensible victory for the U.S., it could have negative long-term consequences if the stringent risk
assessment standards are used against a U.S. food safety regulation in future disputes. This possibility will be
further discussed in Part IV.
F.
Dispute Two: Japan Fruit Case
Fresh from its victory in the BGH case, the U.S. challenged a Japanese regulation on testing of fruit in 1998. The
Japanese feared the importation of the coddling moth, a pest foreign to Japan, into the country on eight U.S.
products.97 In response, Japan ordered that shipments of the products, including shipments of diﬀerent varieties
of the same type of fruit, be tested for presence of the moth before gaining admission into the country.98 The
U.S. challenged this requirement, claiming that testing of diﬀerent varieties of the same fruit was unnecessary and
not based on scientiﬁc evidence.99 If the moth had been killed by procedures used on one variety of the fruit, it
would be killed in the same procedures used on other varieties of the fruit, according to the U.S.100
Japan responded that it had conducted scientiﬁc testing on the procedures used to kill coddling moths and that
96WTO Report of the Appellate Body, EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (reprinted at http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm)
[hereinafter Hormones Appellate Body Report].
97WTO Report of the Panel, Japan - Measures Aﬀecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R
(Oct. 27, 1998) (reprinted at http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm) [hereinafter Japan Panel
Report].
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19the lethal dosage of pesticide diﬀered from variety to variety of fruit.101 The WTO dispute settlement panel
decided that Japan had not based its requirement on suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence because it had not proven a
link between the diﬀerences in the test results and the diﬀerences in the varieties of fruit.102 The Appellate Body
upheld this decision.103 The importance of this decision is that it further narrowed the WTO’s interpretation of
the term “risk assessment.” Again, this narrow interpretation could be used against a U.S. food safety regulation
at some point in the future.
G.
NAFTA
In addition to its involvement in agricultural trade agreements through the WTO, the United States is a party to
several regional trade agreements. It is not necessary to examine each of these agreements in detail; a thorough
examination of one particular regional agreement will illuminate the types of commitments the U.S. has made to
individual countries. NAFTA provides an excellent case study.
NAFTA contains its own version of the WTO’s SPS Agreement in Chapter Seven.104 In fact, the language
of the NAFTA SPS provisions was drawn from drafts of the WTO SPS Agreement, but NAFTA’s version was
passed before the WTO version.105 NAFTA allows the three signatories and their state and local governments
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20to adopt SPS measures to protect human, animal and plant life or health.106 These provisions can be based on
international standards, like those promulgated by Codex.107 They can also be more stringent than international
standards if they are based on scientiﬁc evidence and a risk assessment.108 As a corollary, SPS measures cannot
be maintained if there is no scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for them.109 SPS measures that are based on science cannot
be used as a disguised trade restriction.110 Finally, NAFTA states that its SPS provisions are not to be used to
achieve downward harmonization of food safety standards.111
H.
Looking Ahead: The U.S. Free Trade Agenda in the Twenty-First Century
In examining the above materials on U.S. participation in international negotiations and agreements on trade
in food products, it is possible to ascertain some general trends. First, the U.S. has ordinarily supported
eﬀorts to expand trade between nations. However, there is a tendency on the part of the U.S. to back oﬀ its
pro-free-trade agenda to please special interests. For example, the U.S. was one of the original advocates of
the International Trade Organization, but Congress later refused to ratify the body, leading to its eventual
demise. As another example, the U.S. was the ﬁrst nation to obtain a waiver from its GATT obligations
to assist domestic agricultural interests. Other nations understandably followed suit, whether formally or
informally, and GATT policies on agricultural trade completely disintegrated. Second, the U.S. has also sup-
ported high food safety standards, both domestically and internationally. On the domestic side, the USDA
and FDA are the leading food regulatory bodies in the world. On the international side, the U.S. participates
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21actively in Codex and other international regulatory bodies that govern food. However, the U.S. has also
been suspicious of other countries’ stringent food safety regulations, often attacking them as disguised trade
restrictions. For example, the U.S. was a leading advocate of the SPS Agreement, and it ensured that an
agreement on SPS measures was included in NAFTA. Additionally, the U.S. was the ﬁrst nation to attack
another country’s SPS measures through the WTO dispute settlement process in the Hormones case.
Recent statements by U.S. politicians indicate that the U.S. plans to continue to support free trade in
food in the coming years. At the Agricultural Trade Symposium in 2000, Ambassador Peter Scher, the
Head Agricultural Negotiator in the Oﬃce of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), listed the
U.S.’s goals for agricultural trade negotiations in the twenty-ﬁrst century.112 The seven goals were: (1)
eliminating all remaining export subsidies, (2) reducing trade-distorting support to domestic agricultural
interests, (3) decreasing tariﬀ rates, (4) improving administration of quotas, (5) strengthening discipline
of state trading enterprises, (6) assisting developing countries in obtaining greater market access, and (7)
assuring transparency in regulation of biotechnology.113 The new Bush administration has demonstrated no
signs of diverging from these pro-free-trade goals. In fact, Bush Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman has
made strong statements regarding SPS measures as disguised trade restrictions. At a conference in January
2002, she strongly encouraged EU oﬃcials to reconsider their ban on imports containing genetically modiﬁed
organisms, stating that the ban was not based on adequate scientiﬁc evidence.114 This indicates that the
U.S. may be willing to challenge yet another European food safety regulation as a disguised trade restriction
under the auspices of the WTO dispute settlement process.
These statements by Scher and Veneman, oﬃcials in the last two presidential administrations, indicate a
strong U.S. preference for liberalization of trade in food. But should this be the U.S. policy, especially
112See Peter Scher, Agricultural Trade Symposium: The WTO and America’s Agricultural Trade Agenda,
9 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, 2 (2000).
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22considering the threat of a bioterrorist attack on the food supply? The remainder of this paper will consider
whether the U.S. should change its long-standing advocacy of free trade in food. Arguments and counterar-
guments on economics, food safety, and food security will be considered.
III.
Arguments and Counterarguments on Economics
A.
Argument One: Comparative Advantage and Gains from Trade115
Since the work of David Ricardo more than 150 years ago, economists have long believed that free trade can
improve the welfare of every country. To explain Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, one must begin with a
hypothetical scenario involving two countries that can each produce two goods. Each country has a ﬁnite number
of resources, and it can use these resources to produce only Good A, only Good B, or some combination or Goods
A and B. If Country 1 decides to produce any amount of Good A, it faces an opportunity cost in giving up some
amount of Good B; if Country 1 decides to produce any amount of Good B, it faces an opportunity cost in giving
up some amount of Good A. Ricardo believed that Countries 1 and 2 should work together to produce Goods A
and B instead of producing them separately. Each country should produce and export the good for which it has
the lowest marginal opportunity cost. In other words, if Country 1 gives up less of Good B to produce Good A than
Country 2, then Country 1 should concentrate all its resources on producing Good A and export some of the ﬁnal
product to Country 2. Ricardo stated that the country with the lowest marginal opportunity cost in producing a
115See generally N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics, (2d ed. 1998).
23good has a comparative advantage in producing that good. With a two-country/two-goods assumption, a country
with a comparative advantage in one good must mathematically have a comparative disadvantage in the other
good. A country should refrain from producing a good in which it has a comparative disadvantage and import
that good from its trading partner.
Each country will beneﬁt from this import/export scenario if it can negotiate favorable terms of trade. For
example, assume that Country 1 had the comparative advantage in producing Good A. Now it produces only
Good A, exports some of Good A to Country 2, and imports some of Good B from Country 2. Before this
arrangement, Country 1 had to give up a large amount of Good A to produce any Good B. If it can now negotiate
an arrangement with Country 2 where it trades a smaller amount of Good A for Good B, then it will be better oﬀ.
The same idea applies to Country 2. The advantage of trade between countries is that both countries experience
gains from trade. Both countries are able to utilize their ﬁnite quantity of resources to consume a more valuable
combination of both goods.
Why do gains from trade occur? Basic economic theory proposes two reasons. First, countries have diﬀerent
endowments of resources. For example, South Africa has a large amount of diamond mines and North African
countries are geographically ideal for growing cacao. Second, countries have made diﬀerent levels of technological
progress. Some countries have the machines, education, and skills to produce airplanes, and others are better
suited to produce footwear. By allowing each country to exploit its advantages, whether in natural resources or
technology, free trade allows both countries to be wealthier in the long run.
Finally, economists have long believed that Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage can be extrapolated
beyond the two-country/two-goods assumption. A country like the United States can import and export
many diﬀerent products to and from many diﬀerent countries, and the idea of gains from trade will still
24apply to all countries involved. 93% of economists believe that free trade makes all participating nations
richer.116 As a result of these basic economic arguments, promotion of free trade has become a bipartisan
political goal in the United States over the past few decades.
B.
Argument Two: Trade Restrictions Distort Welfare117
Not only does free trade in goods, including food, make countries better oﬀ, but trade restrictions make countries
worse oﬀ. Basic economics utilizes a welfare model to analyze tariﬀs and quotas. Let’s begin by using the welfare
model to analyze a country that enacts a tariﬀ on imported goods. The foreign supplier will pass the cost of the
tariﬀ along to domestic consumers. This will raise the price of imported goods. Domestic producers of the same
good will observe this and raise the price of domestic goods to exploit their potential gains in revenue. From
the viewpoint of consumers, the entire good, domestic and foreign, has a higher price. According to the law of
demand, when a good has a higher price, consumers will demand less quantity of that good.
The fact that less of the good is now being sold at a higher price has welfare consequences for the society.
First, domestic producers are better oﬀ as long as demand for the good is somewhat inelastic; they more than
compensate for the lower quantity demanded with the higher price, and they earn higher revenues. Second, the
116Id. at 33.
117See generally Mankiw, supra note 107.
25government is also better oﬀ because they earn increased revenue from the tariﬀ. However, consumers suﬀer
because they must pay a higher price for less quantity of the good. If this were a zero-sum game and consumers’
loss was transferred directly to producers and the government, then economists might not object so strenuously.
However, there is also a loss to society called the deadweight loss. This overall loss of welfare occurs because some
consumers who could aﬀord the lower pre-tariﬀ price of the good are now forced out of the market. Economists
measure the total welfare of society by adding together the gains to producers, government and consumers.
When you compare this total welfare in a pre-tariﬀ state to a post-tariﬀ state, the post-tariﬀ state has less welfare
because of the deadweight loss. In the eyes of economists, tariﬀs are unsound policies because they cause this
welfare loss.
It is also important to examine the eﬀects of a domestic tariﬀ on the foreign trading partner. In the foreign soci-
ety, the only actors aﬀected by a domestic tariﬀ are foreign producers of the good. Just like domestic producers,
foreign producers will sell less quantity of the good post-tariﬀ. Unlike domestic producers, foreign producers will
be unable to capture higher revenues. Although they will sell the good for a higher price, the price diﬀerential
will be used to pay the tariﬀ fees to the domestic government. So foreign producers will sell less of the good at
the same price; therefore, they will earn lower revenue.
Faced with this situation, foreign producers have no recourse other than to lobby their own governments to enact
similar tariﬀs on the trading partner. This may start a trade war where each country continually ratchets up its
tariﬀs to punish the other for enacting tariﬀs in the ﬁrst place. While domestic producers and governments will
gain from this scenario, consumers and society as a whole will lose. The size of the loss increases proportionally
with the size of the tariﬀ.
Finally, a welfare analysis of quotas is conducted a bit diﬀerently from the welfare analysis of tariﬀs, but the con-
26clusions are the same. While some segments of society (i.e. domestic producers and government) may gain from
the policy, the society as a whole loses welfare. Thus, most economists oppose both forms of trade protection,
tariﬀs and quotas.
C.
Counterargument One: Normative Objections to Welfare Analysis
While most economists agree that free trade between nations is the ideal policy, there are some normative
and positive objections. On the normative side, some dispute welfare analysis as the proper tool to analyze
trade issues. Dissenters argue that instead of focusing on maximizing the size of the pie, government should
focus on distributing the pie the most equitable way possible. In a system focused on equality, policies that
harm advantaged segments of the population are sound as long as they help disadvantaged segments. In the
case of trade restrictions, tariﬀs, quotas, and other protections that help small farmers and other domestic
producers may be sensible despite the fact that they harm consumers and society as a whole.
A pro-free-trade response inquires whether those helped by trade restrictions are really disadvantaged. A
recent survey found that the majority of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ protections in the United States and Europe
assist large agribusiness corporations, instead of small farmers.118 In the United States at least, these pro-
tections were probably enacted in the ﬁrst place as political concessions to Congressmen from agricultural
states. The theory of special interest capture argues that politicians become beholden to large special inter-
est groups who donate heavily to their campaigns. Since politicians’ main interest is getting reelected, they
will perform special legislative favors for major donors and constituents. Thus, Congressmen who receive
donations from agribusiness corporations are likely to lobby for policies, including trade restrictions, which
118Global Trade Rules ‘Damaging Small Farmers’, Farmers Guardian, Nov. 2, 2001, at 26.
27are favorable to these donors. Of course, these policies harm consumers, but consumers are too diﬀuse a
group to organize a counter-lobbying eﬀort against the protective policies. As a result of special interest
capture and the fact that producers helped by trade protections are not disadvantaged in the ﬁrst place,
equitable arguments in favor of trade restrictions are unconvincing.
D.
Counterargument Two: Flawed Assumptions of Welfare Analysis119
In addition to normative arguments against welfare analysis of trade policies, there are positive arguments
as well. The traditional economic theory explained above analyzes trade policies in the context of perfect
competition. Perfect competition exists in an industry if there are many buyers and seller, the buyers and
sellers are well informed, and there are well-deﬁned property rights. In the real world, however, perfectly
competitive industries rarely occur. Consequently, the beneﬁts of free trade that occur in a theoretical world
with perfect competition may not occur to as great a degree in the real world.
In fact, some economists argue that governments could impose trade restrictions to correct other ﬂaws,
especially externalities, in industries that are not perfectly competitive. One classic example of this type of
thinking is the infant-industry argument. The idea is that businesses that produce innovative products face
positive production externalities. In other words, the companies face great private costs in producing the
innovative good; they must purchase new raw materials and machines, train employees in new tasks, and
develop a new production process. However, production of the good costs society much less because there
are great beneﬁts associated with the good; for example, use of the new good may make other industries
more eﬃcient. Since the private cost of producing the good is greater than the social cost, the good is
underproduced. If the private cost is high enough, the good may not be produced at all. In response,
28government steps in to protect the infant industry from foreign competitors. It enacts a tariﬀ or quota on
foreign competitors of the innovative good in order to give the innovative good time to grow and ﬂourish.
Free trade advocates’ responses to the infant-industry argument and its brethren are threefold. First, the
success of trade protections as a means to alleviate externalities, whether positive or negative, depends
upon correct diagnosis of the size and type of externality in the ﬁrst place. If the data on the degree of
externality is provided by the industry itself, it is unlikely to be reliable. Second, once trade protections
are implemented, they are often diﬃcult to remove for political reasons. It is much easier to insert an
appropriation into the federal budget than to remove it later. Even when industries no longer need trade
protections, they may continue to reap the beneﬁts of extra producer surplus. Finally, the distortionary
eﬀects of externalities and trade protections do not cancel each other out. Although the trade protections
may alleviate or even cure the problem of externalities, trade protections still cause the same reductions
in consumer and social surplus discussed above. Some economists believe that there may be government
policies that are better suited to attack externalities than trade protections. For example, direct subsidies to
the aﬀected industries or the industries’ lenders would still alleviate externalities without causing the same
loss of surplus as trade protections. Free trade advocates therefore concede that free trade does not always
occur in a world of perfect competition. Still, there are beneﬁts from free trade even in a state of imper-
fect competition, and trade restrictions are certainly no way to move closer to a regime of perfect competition.
E.
Counterargument Three: Strategic Trade Policy120
29Finally, a third economic argument against free trade in goods, including food, posits that government trade
policies should be based on economies of scale, rather than comparative advantage. Economies of scale occur
when a company can double its inputs and produce more than double its output. In other words, goods
become cheaper to produce if they are produced in greater quantities. This phenomenon could occur for
several reasons; perhaps raw materials are cheaper if they are bought in bulk or specialization of labor is
more feasible if the workforce is making large quantities of the good. There are some industries, particularly
infant industries, in which economies of scale can only be captured by one company with no competitors. If
more than one company enters the industry, all companies will face diseconomies of scale. In other words,
larger quantities of the good are more costly to produce than smaller quantities.
Advocates of strategic trade policy argue that governments should enact whatever trade policies necessary to
ensure that a domestic company gets a headstart over its foreign competitors in an industry with economies
of scale for only one producer. If one company is suﬃciently ahead of potential competitors, then those
competitors will not enter the industry since they will incur diseconomies of scale by doing so. Thus, the
domestic industry can capture all economies of scale, and therefore all proﬁts, for itself. The national income
of the country that enacted restrictive trade policies will therefore increase.
According to an article by MIT economist Paul Krugman, the positive aspects of this strategic trade theory
have been widely accepted by economists.121 However, the normative conclusion that governments should
therefore enact more trade restrictions has been resisted for several reasons.122 First, economic policies are
made in a world of uncertainty, and it is hard to determine whether particular industries have economies of
scale or not. As such, the economies of scale argument may be a cover used by politicians who want to curry
favor with agribusiness interests by protecting their industries. Second, competition between governments
to be the ﬁrst to support a company with economies of scale may lead to a trade war. As discussed above,
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30this will leave all countries participating in the trade war worse oﬀ. Finally, trade restrictions that help some
domestic industries may harm other domestic industries or consumers. If only one company exists in an
industry, then it has monopoly power and can charge any price it wants. Therefore, consumers, regardless
of whether they are individuals or other companies who use the protected good as an input, will pay more
for the protected good. As a result of these three arguments, most economists believe that strategic trade
theory should not be a guiding force for governments in setting trade policy.
F.
Evaluation of Economic Arguments and Counterarguments
The analysis of economic arguments for and against free trade in food indicates that the U.S. should continue
to pursue a pro-free-trade agenda in international negotiations. However, noneconomic arguments must be
considered before drawing a ﬁnal conclusion. Food safety arguments will be considered ﬁrst, followed by
food security arguments.
IV.
Arguments and Counterarguments on Food Safety
A.
Argument One: Empirical Evidence on Higher Food Standards
Despite claims of WTO critics, empirical evidence indicates that food safety standards have been raised, rather
than lowered, during the existence of the WTO.123 Developed countries passed a great amount of food safety leg-
123Julie A. Caswell, et al., The Downside of Trading Up, Choices: The Magazine of Food, Farm and Resource Issues, June
31islation in the ﬁfteen years before the SPS Agreement, and they kept apace in the seven years after its passage.124
This is largely due to advanced scientiﬁc research techniques that have led to new information about the linkage
between food and public health.125 Also, the media publicizes health information to a greater degree than ever.
News stories about e. coli contamination in the United States, mad cow disease in Europe, and other food-related
scares have raised consumer concerns.126 As a result, consumers and consumer advocacy groups have lobbied
regulatory agencies for higher food safety standards. The empirical evidence indicates that the agencies, at least
in the U.S. and Europe, have complied.
B.
Argument Two: Developing Countries
While critics argue that the WTO does not encourage developing countries to raise food safety standards,
WTO advocates respond with theoretical and empirical claims. Developing countries will raise their stan-
dards for three reasons.127 First, they must at least comply with international food safety standards to ensure
that their agricultural exports gain access to valuable foreign markets.128 Second, domestic agricultural pro-
ducers that already meet high standards will lobby developing countries’ governments for higher standards in
order to gain a competitive advantage.129 Finally, consumers, consumer advocacy groups, and NGOs within
the developing countries will push for higher standards.130 An article by Caswell, Donovan, and Salay cites
Brazil as one example of a developing country that is trying to improve its food safety standards in order to
22, 2000, at 8.
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32export agricultural products to more developed neighbors.131 In the 1990s, the U.S. and EU both enacted
new food safety regulations called the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HAACP).132 Both coun-
tries ﬁrst applied HAACP rules to the ﬁsh products industry.133 HAACP compliance in the ﬁsh products
industry is costly for several reasons: ﬁsh exist in a wide range of places, they are extremely perishable, and
current sanitation and hygiene standards in some countries are very low.134 Since Brazil exports over $134
million in ﬁsh products to the United States each year, its government had to take steps to comply with
HAACP rules.135 In 1993, the Brazilian government mandated compliance with HAACP regulations for all
ﬁsh products companies that export.136 A side beneﬁt of this legislation is that some companies that only sell
ﬁsh products domestically have voluntarily begun to comply with HAACP rules.137 Therefore, Brazil is one
example of a developing country that has increased its food safety standards due to membership in the WTO.
C.
Argument Three: SPS Decisions Enhance Food Safety
Some scholars interpret the dicta in the Appellate Body opinion in the Hormones case as a boost to food safety
regulations.138 One fear of WTO critics is that the sovereignty of individual nations will be reduced because those
nations will have to follow international standards for food safety. Yet, the Appellate Body in the Hormones case
aﬃrmed that Members can maintain more stringent food safety regulations than those promulgated by Codex
if there is a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for higher standards.139 Additionally, the Appellate Body decided that the
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33burden of proof in a dispute under the SPS Agreement rests with the challenger.140 In addition to proving that
the domestic SPS measure is more stringent than international standards, the challenger must also demonstrate
that the domestic measure is not based on scientiﬁc evidence or a risk assessment. Turning to the issue of risk
assessments, the Appellate Body stated that Members may choose any minimum amount of risk that they will
tolerate. The WTO will mandate no minimum amount of risk that all nations must accept. The only requirement
in this area is that some statistical analysis of risk must be conducted; theoretical uncertainty is not enough.141
Next, the Appellate Body declared that it is willing to consider “real world risks” in addition to scientiﬁc data. In
other words, scientiﬁc estimates of risk can be adjusted for factors that are traditionally nonscientiﬁc.142 Finally,
contrary to the views of some WTO critics, the Appellate Body indicated that it is willing to accept minority
scientiﬁc opinions. The only caveat is that the minority opinion must be the consensus of several respected
researchers; the opinion of a lone renegade will not suﬃce.143 These statements of the Appellate Body in the
Hormones case indicate that the WTO wants to promote domestic food safety standards as long as they are based
on a scientiﬁc risk assessment.
D.
Counterargument One: Downward Harmonization of Food Standards
Yet, WTO critics have many responses to these arguments. First, critics complain that the SPS Agree-
ment pushes for downward harmonization of world food standards, whether it intends to or not.144 SPS
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34was drafted and adopted as an agreement to promote free trade, not an agreement to promote the public
health.145 Thus, on close questions, it is structured to fall on the side of the former objective. Additionally,
Member countries of the WTO can challenge another Member countries’ food standards as being too strin-
gent. If the challenger wins, the other country cannot maintain its own system of food regulation unless it
pays a penalty. So, the SPS Agreement can be used to obliterate high food safety standards, but it has no
procedure for challenging countries with low standards.146 Consequently, it could create downward harmo-
nization of food standards if used over the long-term.
E.
Counterargument Two: Minority Scientiﬁc Opinions
Another complaint about the SPS agreement and the disputes resolved under it is that they give little cre-
dence to “minority science.”147 This term refers to evidence or theories that are accepted by only a minority
of the scientiﬁc community. In the Hormones case, the EC presented evidence from a small group of sci-
entists that BGH residue in meat leads to negative health eﬀects in humans.148 The panel and Appellate
Body brushed this evidence aside in the face of huge amounts of scientiﬁc documentation from the U.S.
suggesting that there is no public health risk from BGH residue. The Appellate Body stated that “basing
SPS measures on ‘divergent opinion coming from qualiﬁed and respected sources’ is more legitimate ‘where
the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat
to public health and safety.”’149 This standard only gives credence to minority opinions in the cases of
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35life-threatening risks and imminent threats. However, minority science in less severe cases may be just as
important. Commentators observe that many important scientiﬁc discoveries, including the fact that the
Earth is round, were minority opinions at ﬁrst.150 WTO observers who object to the current treatment of
Members’ food safety regulations would prefer that more credence be given to “minority science.”
F.
Counterargument Three: Narrow Precautionary Principle
A third objection to the SPS Agreement by those concerned with food safety is that use of the precautionary
principle is too restricted. Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows Members to enact “provisional” SPS mea-
sures in the face of uncertain scientiﬁc evidence as long as they undertake scientiﬁc research to substantiate
their views.151 This is the precautionary principle. Critics complain that the principle is too narrow because
it does not account for situations where further scientiﬁc evidence cannot be gathered.152 For example,
it may be impossible to perform scientiﬁc testing on human beings to determine the exact eﬀects of some
biological agent.153 In these situations, Members will be unable to maintain their “provisional” measures in
face of objections by trading partners.
G.
Counterargument Four: Reliance on Codex
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36Another commonly cited food safety objection to the SPS Agreements is that it places too much reliance on
Codex as an international body for setting food safety standards. Critics point out that Codex was founded
as an organization with two objectives: to set food safety standards and to promote international trade.154
In some cases, these objectives are at cross-purposes, and there is no organizational mandate as to which
should prevail. Additionally, Codex standards are approved by a majority vote of member countries.155
Therefore, a single country or group of countries could have legitimate concerns about the safety of a food
product and still be outvoted by countries that export the good. Then, the objecting country or countries
would be held to this lower Codex standard by the WTO unless they could produce a proper risk assess-
ment on their side. Codex critics point to several recent instances where U.S. food safety regulations were
rejected by Codex in favor of less restrictive international standards. For example, the EPA has banned
methyl parathion as a pesticide for use on fruits and vegetables because some evidence shows that it has
negative health eﬀects on children.156 Regardless, Codex approved a maximum residue level for methyl
parathion in June 1999.157 As a second example, the U.S. requires that government-paid oﬃcials from FDA
and USDA conduct inspections of food processing plants.158 Regardless, Codex approved a plan in June
1997 whereby inspections of international food processing plants could be conducted by employees of the
plants themselves.159 SPS critics argue that these Codex decisions unfairly ignore minority opinions on food
safety; as a result, Codex should not be given so much credence in WTO disputes over food safety regulations.
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Counterargument Five: Cultural Diﬀerences Between Countries
Fifth, critics complain that the SPS Agreement pays too little attention to cultural diﬀerences between coun-
tries. To the degree that cultural preferences are based on scientiﬁc evidence, failure to consider them could
endanger food safety. The EC ban on meat products with BGH residue was largely enacted due to consumer
belief that “artiﬁcially enhanced food [is] something inherently unnatural, dangerous and ‘wrong.”’160 These
consumer beliefs were based on newspaper articles about scientiﬁc studies that concluded BGH residue is
harmful to children.161 Whether or not these beliefs were correct, they must have been of great importance
to European consumers and their governments since these governments have refused to accept the WTO de-
cision. Instead, they have accepted the consequences of noncompliance, which include a retaliatory measure
by the United States of $117 million of tariﬀs on certain European agricultural products.162 Some critics of
the SPS Agreement even believe that international bodies should have no authority at all over food safety
regulations because they fail to respect cultural norms.163 These critics argue that food safety standards
are so important and divisive that they should only be enacted by elected bodies, which are accountable to
those who must live with the standards.164 Other critics merely advocate reform of the SPS Agreement to
give more validity to cultural preferences.165 For example, laws based on cultural values could be immune to
challenge under the SPS Agreement if they only incidentally impede trade.166 Regardless of what reform is
taken, critics of the WTO will not be satisﬁed until the entity attaches some validity to cultural preferences.
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Counterargument Six: Developing Countries
A sixth objection to the SPS Agreement by those concerned with food safety is that it fails to handle ad-
equately the issue of developing countries. Article 9 of the SPS Agreement states that developed countries
will provide technical assistance to developing countries to teach them techniques to conform to interna-
tional safety standards.167 Article 10 of the SPS Agreement states that WTO Members will consider the
needs of developing countries when enacting domestic food safety regulations.168 Yet, empirical evidence
shows that developed countries have not complied with either Article 9 or Article 10.169 Thus, developing
countries’ food products are less likely to meet the domestic food safety standards of their more developed
counterparts.170 Unfortunately, agricultural products constitute a large percentage of developing countries’
exports, so these countries are likely to lobby international food safety regulatory bodies like Codex for
lower international standards. Developing countries outnumber developed countries, and Codex decides on
standards with a majority vote. So, developing countries could push for further downward harmonization
of food safety standards.171 Critics argue that this downward harmonization would not occur if the SPS
Agreement made more concessions to developing countries in the ﬁrst place.
J.
Counterargument Seven: Equivalency Agreements
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39Seventh, critics of the SPS Agreement point to equivalency agreements as another threat to domestic food
safety policies. Article 4 of the SPS Agreement provides that Members can declare to other Members that
food safety regimes in their countries are equivalent.172 Equivalency agreements can apply to speciﬁc food
safety provisions in addition to entire regulatory regimes.173 If an exporting country declares equivalence,
then the importing country is required to accept agricultural products from the exporter.174 The problem
is that two countries’ food safety regulations can be “equivalent” under the SPS Agreement even if they are
not identical. An exporting member must only “demonstrate to the importing Member that its measures
achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”175 Therefore,
equivalency agreements could result in further downward harmonization of food safety standards.176 As
an example, USDA allowed exporters of poultry products to declare that they had equivalent regimes of
poultry inspection.177 Thirty-six countries responded by declaring equivalence.178 Two years later, the
USDA completed an investigation designed to assess the equivalency agreements.179 The USDA declared
that four of the exporting countries actually had poultry inspection regimes that were inferior to that of
the United States.180 By this time, the U.S. had already imported over one million pounds of poultry that
had not been adequately inspected.181 Food safety critics point to this as just one failure of the equivalency
system.
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Counterargument Eight: “Under the Table” Deals
Finally, critics of the SPS Agreement argue that it could be used “under the table” to lower domestic food safety
standards.182 Member 1 could threaten Member 2 with a challenge under the SPS Agreement if Member 2 does
not admit Member 1’s agricultural products, even if they fail Member 2’s safety standards. Since many countries
do not want to face the administrative costs of appearing before the dispute settlement bodies, they may concede
without a ﬁght. This would result in further downward harmonization of food safety standards.
L.
Evaluation of Food Safety Arguments and Counterarguments
While the critics of the WTO and its eﬀects on food safety have produced many arguments on their side,
there is no empirical evidence that WTO membership has reduced food safety in the United States. Actually,
food is becoming safer everyday due to advanced scientiﬁc research, new technologies, and stringent regu-
lation by FDA and USDA. The SPS Agreement and the interpretations of it under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding are reasonable. It is rational to require that domestic SPS measures be based on scientiﬁc
evidence and a risk assessment. If a country cannot oﬀer these justiﬁcations for a food safety measure, then
the measure is likely protectionism in disguise and it should not be allowed. It is true that the WTO is
relatively new; future empirical evidence may demonstrate that there has been downward harmonization of
international food standards. If so, the issue should be reconsidered, but until then, food safety is not a
valid reason to alter the U.S.’s position on trade in food.
182Silverglade, supra note 136 at 519.
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Argument and Counterargument on Food Security
A.
Argument: Free Trade in Food Leads to Peace Between Nations
While the term “food security” has been used in the months since September 11 to refer to eﬀorts to protect
the food supply from terrorist attacks, the term originally had a diﬀerent meaning. Human rights activists
had long used the term to refer to the right of nations and their citizens to food. Because of geographical,
environmental, and ecological constraints, some nations are poorly suited for agriculture. Examples include
landlocked countries like the Central African Republics and desert nations like Ethiopia and Somalia. These
countries are therefore reliant on agricultural imports to feed their populations. Consequently, free trade in
food is an important concern for these countries.
Disastrous consequences could result if the international ﬂow of food were disrupted. These consequences
might include famine, political instability, and war. In the words of Henry Hawkins, a former Director of
the Oﬃce of Economic Aﬀairs of the Department of State, “When a country gets starved out economically,
its people are all too ready to follow the ﬁrst dictator who may rise up.”183 Indeed, several scholars cite
economic distress in poor and developing countries caused by the isolationism of the United States as a
primary antecedent of World War II.
If the United States were to ban agricultural imports from speciﬁc nations in response to September 11, the
action would only intensify the problems that led to September 11 in the ﬁrst place. First, these nations
would immediately retaliate with a ban on agricultural imports from the United States. Since the United
States is one of the leading suppliers of food in the world, retaliatory action might severely restrict the sup-
183Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy and Foreign Policy, in U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World
Economy 291-2 (Robert M. Stern ed. 1987).
42plies of food to these already vulnerable nations. This would only harm the populations of these countries
and lead their people to support charismatic leaders like Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. These are
the types of leaders who advocate attacks on innocent people, and their accession to power would only result
in more tragedies like that of September 11.
B.
Counterargument: Trade Liberalization Threatens Food Security
Many human rights activists and WTO critics argue that the free trade regime enforced by the WTO threat-
ens food security in developing countries. The idea is that WTO membership requires developing countries
to reduce their tariﬀs on all goods, including agricultural products, to the levels speciﬁed by the WTO
agreements.184 As a result, domestic markets of developing countries become ﬂooded with cheap imports.
This pushes small domestic producers who must charge higher prices because they face higher costs out of
the market. The domestic producers must ﬁre their employees, leading to increased unemployment. Without
jobs, these people will be unable to avoid food at any price.
C.
Evaluation of the Argument and Counterargument on Food Security
Concerns about food security in developing nations are not a valid reason to abandon trade liberalization.
One problem with the complaints of human rights activists is that there is not enough empirical data to prove
184The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Food Security and Poverty, available at
http:www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedﬁles/Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Food
Security and Poverty.htm.
43that trade liberalization does harm developing countries. The empirical evidence oﬀered so far indicates that
only some developing countries have suﬀered since acceding to the WTO; others have proﬁted.185 Second,
many of the problems allegedly caused by trade liberalization already existed prior to ratiﬁcation of the
WTO. Food shortages in developing countries result more often from poor governmental policies and insti-
tutions than from trade liberalization. Third, if small domestic producers are indeed pushed out of domestic
markets by imports, this is a sign that the domestic producers do not have the comparative advantage in the
good at issue. Developing countries’ governments, international institutions, and NGOs should assist these
small producers in moving to other industries in which they might have a comparative advantage. Finally,
developed nations may have an obligation to assist their less developed counterparts achieve food security;
that is not an issue for this paper. Regardless, this assistance can be provided through less extreme methods
than completely abandoning trade liberalization. Monetary assistance, training programs and low-interest
loans are all possible forms of aide. In sum, the anti-WTO arguments on food security are unconvincing.
On the other hand, the pro-trade arguments are sound. Thus, food security issues are not a valid reason for
the U.S. to abandon free trade in food.
VI.
Recommendations
The analysis of economic, food safety, and food security concerns indicates that the United States should not
change its commitment to free trade in goods, including food. While economists concede that national security
concerns are one legitimate reason to restrict trade, the concerns in this case do not justify such a drastic measure.
For instance, domestically produced food could be attacked just as easily as food imports. Also, restrictions on
185Id.
44trade would be a huge reversal in U.S. foreign policy after the U.S. has been the leading free trade proponent in
the world for the past few decades. Instead the U.S. government should respond to the threat of bioterrorism in
other ways. Here are several recommendations to consider. Some of these recommendations were addressed at
the beginning of the paper in the context of what the government has done so far. The government has even
implemented several of the recommendations to some degree, but it could always do more.
1) Increase Funding for Research into Bioterrorism – While the federal government has funded additional research
eﬀorts at FDA and USDA, it should support more varied research at more varied institutions. Research should
be completed on the biology of foodborne pathogens, diseases caused by foodborne pathogens, cures for those
diseases, possible methods terrorists could use to aﬀect the food supply, and ideal crisis management techniques
in the event of bioterrorism. Research could be done at a variety of institutions, especially universities. Federal
government programs that fund scientiﬁc grants should speciﬁcally search for projects that will investigate some
aspect of the bioterrorism problem.
2) Toughen Import Inspections – The federal government has also hired more food safety inspectors for
FDA and USDA. This eﬀort is commendable, but it is impossible to hire enough inspectors to examine every
imported food product that enters the United States. Instead, the government should try to improve food
inspection technology so individual inspectors can be more productive. Research should be done on inno-
vative inspection techniques. Until then, more inspectors should be hired as a stopgap measure. Currently,
there are only enough inspectors to examine 1% of imports. Increasing the percentage of imports inspected
will act as a deterrent to those who would contaminate imports. It would also encourage foreign countries
and their food production companies to take more safety precautions; these companies would experience a
loss in proﬁts if the United States refused to admit their contaminated food. The higher the chances of such
45losses, the more precautions these companies will take in the ﬁrst place.
3) Work with Domestic Food Companies – After September 11, there was some strife between federal of-
ﬁcials and domestic food producers. Some politicians accused the food industry of attempting to derail
legislation on bioterrorism for economic reasons. These politicians should understand that the U.S. food
industry is just as interested as the government and consumers in preventing a bioterrorist attack. If an
attack occurs on a particular U.S. company or companies, then it will be publicized immediately. Consumers
will understandably respond by refusing to buy the companies’ products; they will either switch to substi-
tutes or refrain from consuming that food item altogether. Since a bioterrorist attack on its products would
damage any company’s bottom line, members of the food industry want to prevent such an occurrence. As
a result, food-related companies and their trade groups were some of the ﬁrst to consider the possibility of
a bioterrorist attack after September 11 and to implement precautionary measures. Therefore, the federal
government should work with the food industry to protect the American public instead of against it. A task
force consisting of both industry executives and government oﬃcials could better address the bioterrorism
threat than either of these groups working alone.
4) Reevaluate the Food Regulatory Bureaucracy – Currently, a wide variety of government agencies have
responsibility for ensuring food safety in the face of a bioterrorist attack. Extensive reform of this bureau-
cracy will be impossible for political reasons; there is also some argument that the government should not
tamper with a bureaucracy that has worked well in the past. However, smaller reforms should be considered
as a way to invigorate the current bureaucracy. Perhaps there should be one federal agency responsible
for bioterrorism issues. On the other hand, bioterrorism is an issue that requires expertise in many areas,
so perhaps there should simply be a federal task force on bioterrorism that consists of oﬃcials from many
diﬀerent agencies. Agencies that should be involved include the FBI, CIA, FDA, USDA, Customs, and the
new Oﬃce of Homeland Security. Food industry oﬃcials could also be invited to participate. Whether or
46not institutional reforms are implemented, better coordination and communication among these agencies
should be a priority.
5) Keep Consumers Informed – Since September 11, the FDA has issued guides to food industry members
about the bioterrorist threat. Similar guides should be issued for consumers. Consumers are the last defense
before the threat of illness due to foodborne pathogens becomes a reality. Therefore, consumers should
be informed of foodborne threats and taught how to examine food to ascertain whether it has been con-
taminated. At the same time, there is a ﬁne line between informing consumers and frightening them. So,
the government should not initiate an in-your-face advertising campaign about the threat of bioterrorism.
Instead, it should make safety information available to those who are interested. Perhaps it could place
informational brochures in grocery stores and extensively update its website about the bioterrorist threat.
6) Reconsider Country-of-Origin Labeling – As stated at the beginning of this paper, the Bush Adminis-
tration adamantly opposes country-of-origin labeling on food products. However, this position should be
reconsidered if consumers would feel reassured by such labeling. At the very least, extensive polling should
be done to evaluate consumer opinion. One beneﬁt of such labeling is that consumers could decide for
themselves whether they want to risk eating agricultural products from places like Sudan or the Philippines.
On the other hand, labeling would be hugely expensive for domestic food manufacturers that import foreign
products as ingredients. Also, such labeling could conﬂict with various provisions of the Technical Barriers
to Trade Agreement under the WTO. A thorough evaluation of the country-of-origin labeling issue is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, the government should at least reconsider the issue since country-of-origin
labeling could lessen the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack.
7) Continue to Fight the War on Terror - Bioterrorism is just one of many ways in which evildoers could
attack American citizens. Since September 11, many government agencies have worked together to anticipate
and prevent the next terrorist threat. The most important factor in ﬁghting bioterrorism is continuing to
47ﬁght terrorism as a whole. To that end, activities by other branches of government that are not speciﬁcally
targeted towards bioterrorism still help reduce the threat of such a disaster. For example, the Justice De-
partment’s eﬀorts to prosecute suspected terrorists may deter terrorist acts. Also, eﬀorts by the FBI and
CIA to monitor suspicious individuals may forestall the next attack. Regardless, the U.S. government should
continue to ﬁght the War on Terror until the threat of future attacks has been signiﬁcantly reduced.
The events of September 11, 2001 changed American society forever. While this country should not live in
fear of the next attack, it should attempt to prevent similar events from ever occurring again. To this end,
the American government should ﬁght all forms of terrorism, including bioterrorism. However, it should
take care to avoid extreme measures that might do more harm than good. Restrictions on trade in food
are an example of an extreme measure that should be avoided. Instead, the U.S. should concentrate on
strictly domestic policies to ﬁght bioterrorism. These domestic policies should be a leading priority of the
U.S. government in coming years.
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